Climate-Change Affirmative Public Attitudes to all types of survey questions are Cultural, across National Publics linked to Religious Belief. Cultural Attitudes inappropriately push Climate Policy. – Footnotes File

For Post 3 of the ABel/CBel series of 3: 'Globally, Religiosity predicts Cultural Climate Beliefs'.

1. Regarding the religiosity gap between children and adults for Spain and Italy, there are few surveys that involve children, so I looked at the (crude average) religiosity gap between younger and older adults, as compared to three other nations in the CSW top ten. The figures are in the Table below. While Italy and Finland have a slightly larger 'youth' religiosity gap than the UK and France, Spain has a much larger gap than all the other nations. This likely explains Spain's high CSW ranking, but the explanation doesn't hold for Italy unless a similar strength effect for children hasn't yet surfaced as they mature to adults. The data comes from World Value Survey (WVS), Wave 5, 2005 to 2009. Not all countries have figures available. See the 'Importance in Life: Religion' category and cross with 'Age'. Original captured data

Table 2 religiosity drop in younger people (WVS,religion: very + rather important)

Age	France	Italy	Spain	UK	Finland
up to 29	35.5	66.3	19.9	33.6	35.1
30-49	33.4	73.6	30.6	37	38.6
50 & up	49	80.7	57.3	46.7	55
rest - 29	**5.70**	**10.85**	**24.05**	**8.25**	**11.70**

and links are in the Excel datafile *for Post 2*. [This footnote is copied from Post 2, Footnote 8].

2. In a search for *any* rationality in the responses to the main YouGov climate-change attitudes survey, I looked at two answers to what I think is one of the most objective questions within the survey, which is: 'Which countries, if any, do you think have had the most negative impact on global warming and climate change?' Followed by a list of 25 countries, where up to 5 can be chosen. This is a weakly CCCC-aligned question, which is to say it does *not* have a strong existential / emotive / personal engagement (excepting responses for the participants' own nations). So, as shown in the first post of the series (and Chart F2 in the datafile for that series), there also *isn't* a simple linear relationship between responses to the question (the response for 'India' was chosen), and religiosity.

Responses regarding any particular nation, *ought to* stem from the context of fairly common and socially unconflicted knowledge about the sizes of national populations and the strengths of economies; at least a rough ranking for the top few nations are relatively well known. This doesn't mean that all answers will be correct, and indeed responses are scattered across all of the 25 countries. But I figured it should mean that while responses would likely be culturally modulated, they ought to be reasonably baselined by an informed rationality. [I used Our World in Data to mark the answers]. So, choices of 'India' should be low(ish) across the responding nations, no matter what their religiosity, and choices for China should be high(ish) no matter what their religiosity, albeit there might still be residual biases imposed on the data by the interaction between CCCC and religiosity. The actual results for 'India' are show in Chart F6 below.

The same envelope is superimposed as from section 2 of the main post, based upon *notional* orange 'very weakly constrained' and pink 'very weakly CCCC aligned' trends.



The first thing to note is that the much larger variability around trend for the orange series is actually included in the envelope here, which I didn't bother with for Charts 2 and 3 in the main post. Like the rest of the envelope it is *notional*, in that I just estimated it by eye (from Chart 4 in the main post). And indeed without doing this, the bottom fringe of data would not be covered! That said, the surprising thing here is that while concentrated more around orange than pink, the data does similarly occupy the envelope, being to some extent stretched between pink and orange 'modes'. Thus, it would seem highly likely that rather than rationality dominating, the same basic effect is going on as is described for Charts 2 and 3.

As discussed in Footnote 10 (and Chart F4) of the first post of the series, India is highly likely aligned to the pink trend due to excess blame responders apportion to their home nation. It's hard to tell whether some of the nations at the LHS are aligned to pink or orange, but Sweden seems unambiguously on the former trend, and others such as Bahrain and Qatar are 'pulled upwards' in the same sort of ambiguity seen within Charts 2 and 3. So what's puzzling for this objective question that probes relatively common knowledge, is that the response, albeit in the same smeared sense as for other Weakly-Framed questions, appears completely cultural in nature. There doesn't even seem to be any arbitrary shift on the Y axis (downwards), on the basis that less folks should pick this wrong answer. [Note, such a shift does occur (upwards) on the next chart]. So, LHS nations are picking this wrong answer far more, merely because they're aligned to the pink or orange trend, which represent (weak) cultural interactions. The position of all nations seems only to reflect religiosity plus whether they're aligned more to pink or orange, *neither* of trend of which represents rationality. [Note: the structure seen here can also be seen in Chart F1 of the first post in the series, and was briefly mentioned in Section 7 of that post, but not pursued there].

Having seen the response for 'India', I couldn't guess the response for 'China', a *correct* answer, except to presume it was highly unlikely to be free of cultural influence. Chart F7 plots the response.



So, this time there *is* an arbitrary shift (upwards), more folks are getting this right. BUT… those nations who get the answer *most* right (towards the LHS), are the very same nations that previously were most *wrong*. It looks very much like they're more right *only* because they're being 'lifted' from the high point of positions (~35% to nearly 50%) that as we saw from the *incorrect* answer in Chart F6, were due to cultural influence! And while the LHS nations are also tightened together, less spread out, nations from about 75% religiosity upwards, are still very smeared between pink and orange 'modes'. In fact, most of those same nations have positions more than passingly reminiscent of their positions in Chart 4, which is a completely different question *not* having an answer that should depend largely on common knowledge.

This is hardly rationality! To a large extent (indeed wholly for Chart F6), it's as though respondents aren't actually answering the question about climate impacts per nation that is asked. They seem instead to be responding instead with their (weak) cultural beliefs about whether the concept of climate-change impacts from national emissions is actually a thing or not in the first place. As Dan Kahan might put it, they're answering more from the stand-point of cultural identity than from any relevant facts about cumulative emissions (based on proxies of population size / economies / history, that they'll roughly know about). Notwithstanding which, it's likely that increased confidence that choosing 'China' is correct, is what's produced a tightening of LHS nations and a 'lift' in all responses. But I'd hesitate to call this 'rationality', given the overall picture depends more upon cultural influence. I labeled it 'rational confidence'. All told, rationality appears to have a very minor contribution across Charts F6 and F7, which I considered its best chance 0:

There appears to be no sign here of the effect, perhaps due to youth influence, that pushed certain nations such as Spain, Italy, Indonesia and India, above the envelope in Charts 2 and 3. Before seeing these plots,

I'd have said that the link to common and unconflicted knowledge would have squashed any such effect anyhow. But this hasn't removed the generic cultural influence. I guess the unconflicted knowledge angle is not of much weight when it only leads back to what is still a socially conflicted issue (climate change). I've little to offer as to why the effect has disappeared, except maybe that youth is not interested in whose fault things historically are, and so disappear back into their nation profiles. But I'm guessing; the whole youth angle, and indeed all these Weakly-Framed responses, could really do with much more follow-up.

3. There could scarcely be a better example of this than governments and the UN elite fawning over Greta Thunberg as she dictates to them extreme policy based upon a catastrophe narrative which is unsupported by mainstream science. These leaders are eager to cash-in on the emotive wave and *apparent* high moral ground such narrative creates, and especially from a person perceived as innocent and incorruptible, while they're apparently blind to the huge burdens placed upon their publics to achieve Greta's dictates (not to mention the lack of actual efficacy wrt to saving lives from severe weather – a stated major motivation). At this previous Climate Etc post, Greta's pitch to authority is compared in detail to other historic well-known child-pitches to authority, distilling down them down to tests that tell us whether each is based on a largely cultural fear or a largely reality-based fear (Greta's is the former).

4. Significant backlash caused by dislocations between the elite and the public on climate-change policy, is increasingly occurring within some European nations towards the left of Charts 1 and 4. Albeit not always a clear climate-change issue alone, as there's often conflation with other environmental issues (from both sides of the elite / public gulf). Plus, there's sometimes an apparent need to find angles that make protests less nakedly oppositional to 'saving the planet', presumably due to fear of attack from what's become the high moral ground. The gilets jaunes demonstrations, originally huge, at a lesser size persistent, not entirely peaceful and spreading out to various protested woes, were nevertheless triggered in the first place by a rise in fuel-tax as a direct result of climate policy. This is despite the fact that this would be a tiny burden compared to the overall necessities of reaching net-zero in near decades, and also within a country benefitting from the largest proportion of nuclear power in the world. This bodes very ill indeed for public acceptance of the net-zero implications, once they understand the true impacts and when these are no longer kicked further down the road (which for a while at least, coronavirus may do). The French government reversed the fuel-tax increase and made many other concessions, and yet still public anger that had become highly inflamed, was not extinguished. The 'yellow vest' label was adopted by protestors in various other countries, although some of these were about issues barely related, or not at all. Only in Belgium and Holland nearby did the motivations appear similar.

The farmers' tractor revolt in Holland, which blocked many of the main roadways with farm vehicles, combined resistance against a number of environmental polices the government was imposing (of which, fuel tax and nitrogen emissions were two) yet a major part of the mood appeared to be that farmers were angry at getting inappropriately blamed for climate-change, and feared having their livelihoods fall under intolerable pressure due to impositions. At the (BBC) link: '"We're getting blamed and badly represented in the media, everyone is blaming us for climate change but planes are worse than farmers and no-one is talking about them," Vincent, a 17-year-old dairy farmer told me.' Despite bringing commuter traffic to a virtual halt, public support was very high, at least for the early weeks. Some of the new regulation seemed to be administered by local regions, of which a few caved and withdrew it, but I never followed up on the full outcome. These protests spread to Germany: "Thousands of farmers drove their tractors into German cities on Tuesday, in protest at the government's new agricultural policies which they say will hurt their livelihoods and make them scapegoats for climate change." And France: "Angry farmers took to the

streets in similar protests in France on Tuesday, while Dutch farmers have staged two nationwide demonstrations in recent weeks." Although on a smaller scale, 1000 tractors descended onto Paris, and protests occurred in Lyon too. Irish farmers also blocked Dublin city-center for two consecutive days. In a clear reference to climate-change rhetoric, one German protestor's placard read '…but without farming, there is no Planet A!' Apparently up to 40,000 German farmers may have taken part, although other estimates are lower. With estimated tractors between 5000 and 8,600 in Berlin alone, plus many support vehicles so there is maybe ~3 persons per tractor, then about 15 to 25,000 altogether. Double this for the whole country seems possible. Although more related to falling prices and budget cuts, there have been farmers protests in Spain and Brussels too.

These protests appear to get strong public support, albeit this reduces if they go on for weeks. And this as XR protests and similar appear to be perceived more and more negatively by some publics at least, indeed as the very minority and irrational stance of the largely privileged, that they generally are. So far, while I haven't probed much, there doesn't seem much sign of backlash within the Scandinavian countries, but in the UK a proposed rise in fuel duty was abandoned in early March seemingly at the mere threat of a revolt (this is sensitive topic in the UK). That makes 10 years in a row that the duty has been frozen. Maybe the government was looking across the channel, and maybe too it was already realized coronavirus would have a major economic impact, so it would be very bad timing. As car-makers already squeal in pain from the early corona impacts and request delays to further environmental regs, plus now even some European governments are calling for delays to climate-change plans to cope with the near-term emergency (albeit those already somewhat skeptic tinged – plus some regional governments, like Flanders in Belgium), it is highly likely that this will embolden public resistance still further as the true impacts of net-zero begin to dawn upon them, and job losses from multiple hits start to pile up. There seems to be an aspect to all this that is in tune with wider political trends, i.e. bulk public resistance to and mistrust of, what is perceived as minority metropolitan (and often advantaged) interests, which an increasingly angry majority feel have left the path of hard realities behind.

5. Existing literature doesn't generally agree that all faiths react similarly to CCCC, i.e. as though, purely in the context of climate change, they're all part of a *single* culture. However, given I can't find anything which actually compares raw religiosity to cultural climate-change beliefs across a significant number of nations (as I do here), how could this be known? Unless I missed it; for sure I could have. But this isn't likely; the issue here is that the literature doesn't view affirmative attitudes to climate-change as largely cultural in the first place. Anyhow, declares the introduction to Randolph Haluza-DeLay, 'Religion and Climate Change: Varieties in Viewpoints and Practices' (2014): '*An analysis cannot homogenize religion into a monolithic category.*' However, just because religions are very varied in nature (this is emphasized, and also within the paper's introduction) doesn't mean their relationships to CCCC *have* to be likewise. Such relationships reflect common cultural basics, such as the disablement of ISk, which isn't necessarily dependent on the precise nature of each faith (and indeed responses from the surveys explored here, show exactly this). And indeed, ISk would only be very different if say one faith has a strong net alliance with CCCC, while another has a strong net resistance. In the data examined here, this is not at all the case. And while there is a vast mosaic of different contributions making up each *net* result, that result nevertheless forms an overall narrative signal to the faithful; practically the whole point of cultures is to ensure all their adherents conform as closely as possible to consensus narratives. Plus, RH-D 2014 makes the starting assumption of a religious relationship primarily to *science and rationality*, and then looks at levels of detail way down, plus within the context of a needed 'mobilization on climate change'. This assumption is not verified, and the attitudes measured here point overwhelmingly to a relationship between *two*

cultures, and not between (religious) culture and rational scientific propositions. Plus, mobilization will be largely from minority local initiatives, so maybe quite different (and chequered) compared to overall bulk national attitudes (indeed, some religions have better execution networks than others, and there will be cells with more, and less, support within every religion, but it's the big picture we need). I come to the conclusion that RH-D 2014 is simply wrong about the most fundamental reactions of religion to climate-change in the public domain, largely due to omission; these aren't measured across many nations anyhow, plus there's no realization that another culture is in play other than religion, i.e. CCCC. Notwithstanding all this, RH-D 2014 is a very useful paper for some intersectional context.